§ Mr. SNOWDENMay I ask on a point of Order whether you, Sir, can explain how it happens that a notice for the rejection of this Bill in my name handed in last night, and which appears on the Blue Paper this morning, does not appear on the White Paper?
§ Mr. SPEAKERWe never put more than six identical notices upon the Paper.
§ Mr. SNOWDENWhat method is adopted in making the selection when a larger number is handed in?
§ Mr. SPEAKERI do not select necessarily from those who appear on the Paper. It depends who gets up and catches my eye.
§ Mr. SNOWDENI was not referring to that. When a larger number than six is handed in at the Table what method is adopted of making a selection?
§ Mr. SPEAKERThe first six handed in are taken. They all appear on the Blue Paper, and the first six handed in appear on the White Paper.
§ Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Bill be now read a second time."—[ Mr. Lloyd George. ]
§ Mr. HOLT:I beg to move, to leave out the word "now," and at the end of the Question to add the words "upon this day six months."
I base my objection to this measure on two different grounds. In the first place, I believe it is intended to be used as an implement of excessive development of the military side of our effort in the War. I think it is throwing the weight of this nation unduly on the side of military enterprise. I object to it also because there underlies it a theory of the relation of the State to the individual from which I entirely dissent. I think it makes inroads on the individual which are entirely unjustifiable. The first point involves a review of the whole part which this Empire is to play in the conduct of the War. I want to recall to the House and to the Minister of Munitions a speech which was made in this House exactly one year ago by the then Chancellor of the Exchequer, a speech which, I think, laid down very fairly the proper line on which this country should act in the prosecution of the War. This is what was said: I think the Allied countries ought to determine the part they wish Britain to play in the combination, and the best service she can render. What service can Britain render to this great combination? She can keep command of the seas for the Allies. She has done so, and she will maintain complete control to the end. That is the invaluable service which she is rendering to the Allies. It is essential to the ultimate success of their arms, especially in a prolonged war, because the longer the war the more the command of the sea counts. Supplies come from overseas, there is the freedom to choose the point of attack, and there are various other points which I need not labour. What is the second service which Britain could render? She could, of course, maintain a great Army, putting the whole of her population into it, exactly as the Continental powers have done. What is the third service? The third service which she can render is the service which she rendered in the Napoleonic War, of bearing the main burden of financing the Allied countries in their necessary purchases for carrying on the War—purchases outside their own country more especially—and also to help the Allies with the manufacture of munitions and equipment of war. Britain can do the first, she can do the third, but she can only do the second within limits, if she is to do the first and the last, and I think that is important."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 4th May, 1915, col. 1014, Vol. LXXI.] 144 I quote those words because I think they sum up the situation, and they express the method of dividing the energies of this country in the prosecution of the War very properly. They were spoken exactly a year ago, and I imagine that the right hon. Gentleman who spoke them then still believes that they give an accurate description of the part which Great Britain should play. In his speech a few day ago the Prime Minister, in shorter words, reiterated the same point. Before we pass this Bill we ought to satisfy ourselves that the first and the third of the services which the Minister of Munition held out as the most valuable contribution we could make to the joint combination of the Allies are amply provided for. If hon. Members will cast their minds back to the 7th March last they will remember that there was a Debate on the Navy Estimates. On that occasion the late First Lord of the Admiralty (Colonel Churchill) made a speech which certainly indicated to the House, and I believe caused many people to think, that there was reason for believing that the development of our Navy was not going on as satisfactorily and as rapidly as it ought to have done. I have read through that Debate again, and I think I am right in saying that the present First Lord of the Admiralty (Mr. Balfour) did not express himself as absolutely satisfied with the way in which the shipbuilding for the Navy was going on, and my recollection is that the House was not satisfied at that time that there was not an element of truth in the suggestion which he right hon. Gentleman the Member for Dundee (Colonel Churchill) made, that the Navy, as regards equipment and shipbuilding, was not being kept up to the very highest state of development. We ought to be satisfied by the most explicit assurances of Ministers that there is no foundation whatever for the suggestion that we are unable to carry on shipbuilding for the Royal Navy as rapidly and as successfully as the protection of our country and of the whole of our overseas traffic makes necessary.
I do not think there is anybody in any quarter of the House who will dispute that the predominance of the British Navy on the seas is the most vital point in the successful prosecution of the War. If by any accident the British Navy were to lose the command of the seas, 20,000,000 men in France would not save us from 145 disaster. If we cannot maintain command of the seas everything is lost. There is another matter in this connection upon which I should like some information. I want to know whether all the persistent repair work that necessarily has to be done for the warships is being carried on as promptly as it ought to be. Anyone who knows anything about shipbuilding knows perfectly well that one of the difficulties in getting mercantile vessels completed is that the men who ought to be doing engineering work are constantly being taken away for the repair of warships. It is very necessary that the warships should be repaired promptly and put to sea at once, and everything else must give way to that, but there ought to be sufficient men for both purposes. It is unsatisfactory, as everybody knows, when men who are engaged on shipbuilding are taken off for repair work. It is not good for either class of work. If both forms of work are to be done properly there ought to be an ample supply of men to give independent gangs for each separate form of work. I do not want to say very much on the subject of mercantile shipbuilding, but I think it is generally known that for a year past, and even to-day, mercantile shipbuilding is virtually at a standstill. People may say, and no doubt it is quite true, that efforts are being made to complete a certain number of ships for sea. No doubt some work is being done, but as compared with the normal output of mercantile tonnage from our shipbuilding yards, what is going on now is really trifling. I would remind the House in this connection that owing to the action of mines and submarines, which do not alway sink the vessels against which they explode, there is an exceptional amount of heavy repair work in regard to mercantile tonnage going on in all our great ports. That, of course, requires attention, and requires men just as much as building does. There was an interesting debate yesterday in another place which I commend to the attention of hon. Members, because it will save me from the necessity of laying before the House many facts which were very clearly and very well put by Lord Beresford and Lord Curzon. Let any hon. Member read that debate, and he will see that it is very plainly admitted by two Noble Lords, neither of whom is a shipowner, and, therefore, neither of whom is open to the implication of personal interest in the 146 matter, that the maintenance of the British mercantile marine is one of the prime necessities of the successful conduct of the War. Perhaps I may be allowed to make an observation on this point, because I know people have suggested that I take an interest in this matter and speak about it purely from motives of personal advantage. If anybody would consider the point they would see that the one person who loses by an increased amount of shipbuilding is the shipowner, because he is making more money out of a small number of ships than he could possibly do out of the larger number which everyone desires to see produced in order that freights may be reduced.
It is not only the difficulty of obtaining men which confronts us. There are very great difficulties in obtaining material. It is almost impossible to get reasonable deliveries of any sort of shipbuilding material. That means that iron and steel are very scarce, and they are very scarce for the vast number of other trades which depend upon iron and steel. Coal is very scarce. We are having very great difficulty in getting anything like an adequate quantity of coal. The output of coal has fallen off. On this point I want to draw the attention of the House to a fact which was referred to at Question Time today. The House will know that under ordinary circumstances it is the custom to supply the River Plate with coal from this country. We are so short of coal that in spite of the fact that everybody is regretting the shortage of mercantile marine tonnage, vessels are being sent round by America, a very considerable deviation, in order to take coal to the River Plate. That means that because we are short of coal in this country there has to be an unnecessary waste of mercantile tonnage. It also means that the balance of trade is affected adversely against us. The railways in the River Plate belong in the main to British capitalists, and we are buying in North America goods which we ought to be able to export from this country, thereby injuring our commercial position. In every direction of commerce in which I am interested, and in which I can get an accurate information, there is a universal and serious shortage of labour. We cannot get the men at the docks to load or unload. There is a shortage of labour on the railways. What is the result? The men have been overworked; they are getting irritable and touchy, as 147 overworked men do, and you have in front of you the prospect, if you are not careful, of a great deal of friction, not because people are bad tempered, but because an overworked set of men naturally, in any walk of life, tend to become unreasonable and difficult to deal with. You cannot keep a nation going for a long period under a system of overwork and high pressure.
I have heard in recent Debates suggestions made to this House that the difficulties that have arisen with regard to labour are entirely due to the voluntary system, which caused the wrong men to be recruited. I cannot see how that suggestion can be justified. What was the trouble? The very people, the War Office, who are going to be allowed to conduct a compulsory system of recruiting, are the very people who had not got more sense than to go and take the men who, they ought to have known, were essential for the industries of the country. If these people accepted the wrong type of man in the Army, the man who would be more useful at home than in the firing line, what guarantee have we got that the same men will not do it again? And there is this to be remembered, that the persistent suggestion which goes on all the time that those persons who serve their country otherwise than in the firing line are doing work of less value than those who go into the firing line is bound to drive a great many courageous men, and a great many men who are not very courageous, to think that it is their duty to go into the trenches rather than remain in the workshops. From the start of this War there has been a persistent suggestion that work in the trenches is more valuable than work in the workshops. I admit, like everyone, that work in the workshops is far pleasanter than work in the trenches. The man in the workshop is having the thick end of the stick. But it does not follow because one form of work is more pleasant than another that therefore it is less desirable and less valuable than another. That is a distinction which, I think, has never been properly made. It is constantly suggested that the man who takes the more pleasant form of work is doing something which is less desirable than that which is done by the man who takes the less pleasant form of work.
Turn for a moment to the purely financial side of this question. A year ago the 148 then Chancellor of the Exchequer spoke very strongly of the necessity of helping our Allies by financial contributions. No one will deny that the suggested necessity is far more urgent to-day than it was a year ago. On the 9th of March, in the Debate on Free Trade, I took the liberty of pointing out to the House the very serious position in which our Allies were as regards their solvency. No one can deny that as time goes on the Allies must become to a steadily increasing degree dependent upon British credit, which is based upon the prosperity of British trade, for the means of carrying on the War. If they are to keep their Armies in the field it is necessary that we should be able to keep our trade in the field. Some hon. Gentlemen talk as if trade were carried on for no purpose whatever, except for the profit and private gratification of the traders. That is, of course, an absurd idea. We carry on trade because, without the profits gained from trade, it would be absolutely impossible to carry on the War. It would be impossible to pay for the countless commodities which we have to obtain from all parts of the world, and I think that it would be impossible to pay the wages and pensions which are very properly due to our soldiers. The real foundation of this alliance is the control of the sea by this country, and the credit of this country, and if anything is done to imperil either of those two foundation stones, then the whole joint plan of campaign is going to fail, because militarism will be triumphant.
The question whether you have more or fewer soldiers may indeed involve a question whether you get victory at an earlier or a later date; but the question whether the Navy can stand firm and whether our finances can stand firm is not a question of victory sooner or victory later. It is a question of victory or defeat. With regard to the particular measure which we have got before us, I want to draw attention to one matter, as to which I hope we may be permitted to have some information. During the Debate, in the speeches which have preceded this, the Prime Minister has clearly laid down that he intended to take 200,000 men, and no more, from the unattested married men. I find nothing whatever in the Bill which limits this number to 200,000 men, and I want to know from the Minister of Munitions, who, I understand, is going to speak, exactly what security the House has got, or what is supposed to be the security that 149 no more than 200,000 men will be taken. [HON. MEMBERS: "NO security!"] The right hon. Gentleman told us most explicitly that that is the maximum number of men who would be taken. [HON. MEMBERS: "No!"] I think that my impression is quite correct. That is what we were told. The House ought to know what security we have that no more are going to be taken than the number which we were told was the maximum which could be taken with safety. The policy of the large Army involves the policy of the knock-out blow. It means that if you are going to have a large Army you have got to use it at once, and you have got to bring the War to a speedy termination, and the question which we have got to ask ourselves is whether, if we did this, we should be able to stay the course? In this connection I may read a short article from the military correspondent of the "Times," who, I understand, is regarded as a considerable expert in these matters: Now it is our turn, but we must not imperil our success by premature attacks before we possess the superiority in numbers necessary for a crushing victory, or for a continuous offensive. Whether 1916,1917, or 1918 will give us this opportunity it is for the Allies' Staffs to decide, but history will never forgive us if out of sheer impatience, or war weariness, we hazard a brilliant future and a sure victory by engaging in a genera] offensive before we are ready. 4.0.P. M.
That seems to me to be a very sound doctrine, but the question I want to put to the House is this: Suppose that our Army is not ready until 1918, are we quite sure that our financial position will remain as it is until 1918? I have always thought this was going to be a long war, and I want to be sure that we can stay the course. It has always seemed to me that when we started this War we were in the position of an athlete who had made the three mile race his special study, and who was suddenly asked to run on a quarter of a mile course. The policy of shortening the course is a very dangerous one, and we ought to be quite satisfied that we can stay the course. I do not know what the present Chancellor of the Exchequer thinks of it, but I should have thought that anybody who knows, what is common property, the financial position of our friends, must be perfectly well aware that there is not the remotest chance of our being able to stay the course until the year 1918. We are not likely to stay the course until 1918 at our present rate of expenditure. Let us be satisfied on this subject. If we cannot stay the course, had we not better modify, as I think we should do, these pro- 150 posals? [Interruption.] This is a place in which we are discussing publicly our public policy, for the purpose of seeing whether it will bring the War to a successful conclusion, and if we have good reason, or any reason, for believing that the policy is a wrong one, then we are going to say so. I want to ask another thing with regard to this Bill. I want to know how it is that those who are responsible for it, and who support it, are willing to vote for it, although Ireland is left out of it. In the previous measure, based on the pledge given with regard to recruiting, there was good reason why Ireland should be left out of it. I cannot see that there is any reason why Ireland should be left out of the present Bill, or why those who are prepared to vote for it—I do not care in what quarter of the House—should exclude Ireland. It is common knowledge that in the whole of Ireland a much smaller proportion of the population is engaged in what may be called essentially civil service, in connection with the War, than there is in Great Britain, and I think we ought to be told why Ireland is excluded. I cannot suppose that these things are being done purely as a political manœuvre. The previous Military Service Bill was founded on a specific pledge, and Ireland was left out, and we want to know, and the public ought to be told, why Ireland is left out of this measure. I want to ask right hon. Gentlemen who are going to vote for this Bill why they stop short at military compulsion and refuse to include industrial compulsion? The Prime Minister used, only two days ago, in this House, these words: That is to say, if they can be spared from industry without incapacitating us from the discharge of other responsibilities which, in our judgment, are as essential to the successful prosecution of the War as the maintenance of a fixed number of men at the front. If it is right to compel men to fight in the trenches, surely it must be equally right to compel them to do comparatively safe industrial service at home, which, as I understand from the Prime Minister, is equally essential to the prosecution of the War. [An HON. MEMBER: "Not the same wage"] I am going to vote against every form of compulsion, but I am entitled to ask those who support this measure the reason why they will not apply it to industrial service at the same time that they compel men to go and fight in the trenches. It may be necessary some day to compel colliers to hew coal in the same 151 way as you compel precisely the same people to go to the trenches. I want to put this to the House. You are going to compel men to enter the Army in such numbers that only upon the nicest calculation can you discover that there are enough men left at home to carry on the essential industries of the country, and, under this nicety of calculation, you expect every man to play the part assigned to him. If you have calculated with exact nicety the number of coal miners, if you have calculated with exact nicety the number of riveters, if you have calculated with exact nicety the number of persons in every other class of trade that you require, how can you escape the necessity of dealing with the claim of each man to play the part assigned to him? I think you will find yourselves, later, in a very difficult position indeed, when proposals come from some quarter that compulsion should be carried a step further.
Then as to the Special Reserve. People are to be put into the Special Reserve in order to do civilian work, when it is necessary and convenient to call them out, for the War. I have a very strong suspicion that the civilian work they will be asked to undertake will be work approved by the military authorities—the sort of civilian work which they think most convenient to themselves. In addition to these reasons, and I submit they are very substantial reasons, which should be considered before passing this measure into law, I object to this or any other form of compulsion for personal service, because I think it is based on an entirely wrong conception of the relation of the individual to the State I do not agree with the view that the State should be a great machine run by politicians and bureaucrats in which every single person is to have his place, his own proper little pigeon hole, and in which everyone is to do the work assigned to him. I entirely disagree with that idea. It is, as far as I understand it, the German idea, and carried out to its logical conclusion it will inevitably end in that Prussian militarism which it is the object of the War to destroy. I do not believe that it is the proper way to destroy Prussian militarism, and the best way to meet that system of militarism is to bring to defeat it the great forces of freedom and British liberty. I submit that if the voluntary system had been properly pursued we would have readily obtained the men required. This 152 principle of compulsion has been tried before in this country, some 250 years ago, and I think that forebears of the Minister of Munitions, like my own forebears, did everything they could to prevent the experiment which was then attempted of being brought to a successful conclusion, and I think it will be agreed that on the whole that it was a good thing for this country that the British Nonconformists succeeded in breaking down the attempt to establish Parliamentary uniformity. Yet it seems to me that is the principle, the essential principle which is being set up to-day, the principle that it is right for the State to say what is the duty of the individual citizen, and then compel him to do it whether his conscience agrees with it or not.
I hope we are going to find, when the Bill leaves this House, that some better provision has been made for the conscientious objector. It is really not too much to say that they are treated in many parts of the country in a manner which is simply scandalous. The military authorities and the tribunals openly flout the declared opinion of this House. If this measure had been introduced sixteen years ago, when, I think, both the Minister of Munitions and myself were of military age, I believe we should have been found at that time to be conscientious objectors. I should have objected if I thought it was wrong. If there were one single man who honestly believed that this country was in the wrong, I think it would be an outrage to make him take up arms in a cause which he believed to be unjust.
The Prime Minister made an appeal, with which everyone must have sympathy, for support of the Government. When we are asked to support the Government I think it not unreasonable to call attention to the way in which this measure has been put before the country. First of all, we had the Derby campaign; then we had the Prime Minister's pledge to married men which always appeared to me to be a very unwise pledge, because it took for granted those who were to be compelled to go— the single men—and those who were not compelled to go, the married men. That, in my opinion, was a very mistaken consideration as between two men. I have always thought that the principal consideration was the comparative fitness of two men for military work, and their value for work at home, and that the question of marriage and its responsibilities was only a matter or the proper 153 factor which should decide the scale between the two parties in determining, where other considerations were equal, who was to go to the front. Then there was the Bill of January to redeem the pledge which had been given and that as followed by this institution of universal compulsory service. As to the first Bill, I would remind the House of some of the arguments used in support of it. This is one from the First Lord of the Admiralty on the 6th January: I do not believe that this Bill is the thin end of the wedge or by any conceivable turn of the wheel of fortune can be made the thin end of the wedge of a universal system of Conscription— Then, after a short interval, he went on to say: Why, Sir, it is the strongest argument against it. Then I turn to the Bill and I find on the very first page of it: CLAUSE 1.—( Extension and Continued Operation of the Military Service Act, 1915.) As if the whole of this Bill were not the thin edge of the wedge. The first Bill is the foundation of the second Bill, and the second Bill is simply by reference to the first. Is not that a scandalous way of introducing this great change? It is not fair that we should be told in January that a certain measure cannot lead to another, and that in May the second measure should be produced, and it should be found that the first measure is the very foundation stone of it. On the 9th March, this year, the Prime Minister, in his place in this House, said that he was still a supporter of voluntary service. Now, on the 4th May, we have the Second Reading of the Bill introduced by the right hon. Gentleman, in favour of universal compulsion. That is not fair, straightforward dealing. If we are to have a system of compulsory military service, then for heaven's sake let us have it from right hon. Gentlemen who believe in it. I do not care very much what the political party is to which right hon. Gentlemen sitting on the Front Bench happen to belong, but what I do care about is that no right hon. Gentleman should introduce into this House a Bill in which he does not honestly believe. If the Government want to know the reason why they are losing authority in the country, that is precisely the reason. Ministers may think it right to change their minds, but if they do they would be well advised to cross the floor and let the persons who believe in the policy that is being adopted go and carry it out.
154 At various times we have had appeals to let this measure pass without discussion, and we had an eloquent appeal last night from an hon. and gallant Gentleman to allow the country and the House to appear to be unanimous. I do not know that unanimity is in itself a very necessary or very desirable virtue. The most complete case of unanimity that I have ever heard recorded was that of the Gadarene swine. I never heard it was considered that unanimity alone in that case brought about success to the operations of the herd. In a matter of this sort the duty of the minority appears to me to be this. It is our duty to state, I hope politely and courteously, but firmly, what our views are, and our reasons for dissenting from the policy adopted by the Government, and to carry that, as we intend to carry it, into the Division Lobby. I would remind the House that though we oppose this Bill, almost all of us who are going to do so, and certainly I myself, are entirely at one with, I believe, everybody else in the House, in desiring to win this War and bring it to a successful conclusion. I venture to differ as to the best method to accomplish that end, and it is a difference as to the means, and not as to the end that separates some of us from the vast majority of our colleagues in this House. But however much we disagree with the policy which the Government are adopting, once we have had our hearing, and when once the House has taken its decision, it will be my object, and I believe it will be the object of all my Friends, to-do everything we can to make the policy, even though we think it a mistaken one, successful. We have just as much desire to win the War, and we are just as ready to do, according to our judgment, the best that in us lies to bring that result about. I beg to move.
§ Mr. LEES SMITHI beg to second the Amendment.
When the first Military Service Bill was before the House I did not speak on it, but I voted against it in all its stages. When the first Bill was before the House it was suggested that some of those who objected to the Bill were indifferent as to what might be the final result of this War. I do not think they quite see our point of view. Our point is this. I heard the other day in the Secret Session the estimates of the figures which the Prime Minister gave. It is a great disadvantage from the debating point of view that one 155 is not able to exactly criticise those estimates of figures, because the impression they made upon my mind, and which has been strengthened by examining them afterwards, is that this Bill is in the nature of a gamble which is far more likely to weaken our total effective contribution to the War than otherwise. I have not followed this question in great detail, but if there is one impression I got more clearly than the rest it is that the r61e which this country is playing as the financial reserve of the allied combination is becoming day by day so vital and decisive that if there is any reasonable doubt whether a certain section of men should be utilised for that purpose or for any other, then the benefit of the doubt ought in ordinary caution to be given to our credit and to our finance. I read three or four months ago a speech which was delivered in this House by the President of the Board of Trade. I do not say that necessarily what, he told us then he would have to accept now. But at that time he told us what he considered from his point of view and his responsibility, the final limit to the number of men that could be raised for the Army without imperilling our industries. That number has almost been reached, and when the attested married men who have not been called up are summoned to the Colours and when the other recruits which are in sight are also summoned, that number will have been long overstepped. We are now by this Bill exhausting our financial resources for the remainder of the War by a further draft of 200,000 men who will, I suppose, be drawn from that class of married settled moneyed men whose economic value is high, and whose military value is correspondingly small. That is the point of our objection.
If, as is surely possible, this War settles down to a long-drawn-out war of endurance, then, surely, finance and credit will become the determining consideration, and the point of our objection—of my objection—is that this Bill is imperilling the factors which this country alone can provide, and on which in a war of endurance the whole allied combination will become dependent upon us, in order to give a comparatively slight increase of numbers to the military role in which we are no more essential than the others of the Allies. Those considerations appear to me to be so strong that I believe if the Government had been absolutely free to 156 determine this question simply by balancing our financial as against our military requirements, they would not have introduced this Bill, but that has not been the case. There is a considerable demand in the country I do not deny, but the demand arises especially from the attested married men. Surely it is true that those men are not basing their demand for this Bill upon a balance of our financial as against our military requirements, but this demand, this popular demand, is based on the argument that compulsion is essential to secure fair and just treatment as between one man of similar age and another. Those who have followed the controversy can see that the real issue which has laid behind this long conflict is not the balancing of the issue as between financial and military consideration, but is a struggle between those who believe—in the phrase of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Dublin University (Sir E. Carson)—in equality of sacrifice, and those who believe in voluntary service. That is the issue. You cannot have both. If you have voluntary service, then it must happen that a certain portion of men—a certain fraction of men—will not rise to their responsibilities. There is something to be said for equality of sacrifice, but if you have got to choose, the thing for which we stand is by far the finer and nobler of the two.
It is the absence of Conscription from this country which has given our people that self-dependence, that initiative, and that freedom of spirit in which they have led their way throughout the world. Those of us who believed in it before the War have more reason still to be proud of it since now that we see what it has accomplished in the stress of war. In spite of these Conscription Bills it must be true to say that over 96 per cent, of our Forces will have been raised by voluntary service. To impose conscription upon this country in order to apply this theory of equality of sacrifice to the remnant of about 4 per cent, is to tarnish without proper cause one of the proudest achievements of our race. This conscription is already beginning to cast a shadow over the Army as a whole. We cannot have voluntary service and compulsory service existing without any means of distinguishing them side by side without the discredit of one reflecting on the other. This effect is beginning to operate now. These Conscription Bills are lowering the status of those who have attested under the group system. After all, I play a very unimportant and 157 unheroic part, but I hear what ordinary soldiers are saying. If hon. Members wish to hear it for themselves and do not believe in what I say let them go to any London railway station and let them watch batches of Derby recruits being sent from the railway station to some camp in the country, and let them listen to the remarks of the soldiers standing by. The stigma of conscription is stamped upon them all. Men who have made great sacrifice in order to respond to Lord Derby's appeal are being robbed of the credit to which that sacrifice entitles them. The other day the hon. and gallant Member for Hull made a very striking speech in this House, in which he said that those of us who still insist on voluntary service do so because we are dominated by the obsession of prewar ideas. Why, Sir, if it had not been for pre-war ideas this Bill would not have been introduced. This Bill is not the result of any careful balancing of military and financial considerations. The driving force behind it has been the agitation, ferocious and blatant, beginning from the very commencement of the War, and continuing without ceasing and without scruple ever since—the agitation of those who, before the War and after the War, believed, and still believe, in Conscription for Conscription's sake.
§ Mr. R. McNEILLThe two speeches to which we have just listened have been very moderate presentations of the views held by the hon. Members who made them. The main position taken up by those hon. Members is really one which is not contested. The hon. Member for Hexham (Mr. Holt) laboured very considerably, with quotations from the Prime Minister and from the Minister of Munitions, to show that there are three factors in the contribution which this nation can make to the War, and he endeavoured to prove that the due proportion between those factors cannot be observed if this Bill be carried into law. That was really the gist of his contention. I do not believe that there is anyone in this House who for one moment questions the principle laid down by the Prime Minister and by the Minister of Munitions in the speeches from which the hon. Member quoted. The only difference between us is that, with the exception of the very small body to which the hon. Member and his Seconder belong, this House is agreed that we can pass this Bill into law and obtain a very considerable augmentation of our military forces 158 without in any way dangerously sacrificing our contribution as regards either commerce of finance. The hon. Member spoke about a serious shortage of engineers, and he quite rightly pointed out that, among the pieces of work which it is extremely necessary for us to carry on with great vigour at the present time, few, if any, are more important than the maintenance and increase of our mercantile marine. He wished us to draw the inference that, because there are a certain number of engineers who have been taken from that work to do Admiralty work from time to time, therefore the men cannot be spared to go into the Army. I do not know whether the hon. Member heard the speech made yesterday by the right hon. Member for the Blackfriars Division of Glasgow (Mr. Barnes), in which that right hon. Gentleman stated that, of his own knowledge, there were many thousands of members of the Amalgamated Society of Engineers who had enlisted and were now in the Army. The inference that I drew from that statement was this. I quite agree with the hon. Member that the enlistment of those men was in many cases a mistake; but that was entirely due to the fact that at the time the War began; and long afterwards, we had to depend on the voluntary system. If we had had then a system such as this Bill will introduce, under which the military authorities could take the men they want and choose between those who would be most useful for the Army and those who would be most useful for the workshops, there would have been no occasion for them to take those engineers to whom the hon. Member referred. When this Bill is passed, I take it, if the military authorities find that the accession of strength under the Bill is sufficient to enable them to do so, there will be nothing in the world to prevent their releasing from service in the Army some of those engineers, who may then go back and do the work which the hon. Member for Hexham thinks, and I quite agree, so necessary, but which we have not the men in the country now skilled to perform.
The hon. Member went on, not merely to say that there was a shortage of engineers for this particular work, but to complain—and we have heard the same complaint from many sources—of a general shortage of labour in this country. I do not believe that there is any shortage of labour whatever. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh!"] By that I mean, of course, for necessary work. The labour is unorganised. It is 159 impossible at the present moment to get workers in one direction or another for work which the nation requires. But why? Because, go where you will, whether in London or in the country, you cannot turn your eye in any direction without seeing in progress work for which there is no occasion whatever. I had an example in a very small way near my own house in London the other day, but the same thing is going on everywhere. There is a thoroughfare which is subject to very little traffic and the surface of which was in excellent repair; yet a whole gang of men were employed only a week or two ago putting a completely new surface on that road.